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Conicts and Common Interests in Committees
By Hao Li, Sherwin Rosen, and Wing Suen

Committees improve decisions by pooling members' independent in-
formation, but promote manipulation, obfuscation, and exaggeration
of private information when members have conicting preferences.
Committee decision procedures transform continuous data into or-
dered ranks through voting. This coarsens the transmission of infor-
mation, but controls strategic manipulations and allows some degree
of information sharing. Each member becomes more cautious in cast-
ing the crucial vote than when he alone makes the decision based on
own information. Increased quality of one member's information re-
sults in his casting the crucial vote more often. Committees make
better decisions for members than does delegation. (JEL D71, D82,
C72)
The subject of this paper is how small groups make decisions when diverse individual
preferences are known to all, but when individuals possess private information that must
be elicited in committee deliberations. Small-group decisions are ubiquitous for decisions
under uncertainty. Judgment by a jury of one's peers, not by a single person, is the
hallmark of the American criminal justice system. Committees recommend hiring and
tenure decisions, and are essential for project and investment undertakings in business
rms and for many administrative decisions in all organizations. Group evaluations bring
dierent points of view to bear on an issue. They allow the pooling of information that is
not otherwise available to a single decision-maker. But conict among committee members
limits the possibilities for information pooling. It is in the self interest of committee
members to manipulate their evidence|to exaggerate favorable data that support their
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preferred outcome, or conceal unfavorable data that work against it. This paper studies
the tension between information aggregation and strategic manipulation of information in
small committee decisions.
The statistical value of aggregating diverse information among group members is an
old idea. Condorcet (1785) proved that voting groups with diverse information make
better decisions the larger the group size, using an early application of the law of large
numbers (see also Alvin Klevorick, Michael Rothschild and Christopher Winship, 1984).
The economics literature on group decisions has paid special attention to eliciting private
preferences for public goods (Allan Gibbard, 1973; Mark Satterthwaite, 1975). The study
of eliciting private information from an expert was initiated by Vincent Crawford and Joel
Sobel (1982), who show that the expert's information must be garbled before being used
by an uninformed decision maker with dierent preferences in the decision.
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In committee
decision-making, sharing or pooling of private information is essential. Little has been
said about the strategic aggregation problem.
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We show that when committee members
disagree on how their information should be used, committee decisions are made through
voting or scoring procedures. Continuous information is garbled and transmitted in ordinal
forms. Ecient pooling of private information in a committee is impossible when members'
interests conict. Voting in committees is necessary to control conicts and allow some
degree of information sharing.
In the model set up in section I, a committee must choose between two alternatives.
Individual committee members are known to have partially conicting interests in the
decisions. Committee members may disagree, but their disagreement disappears when the
evidence is suciently strong in either direction. For example, in a recruitment committee,
each member may be biased in favor of hiring if the candidate is in his own eld, but all
are willing to hire a person of suciently high quality regardless of eld. But private
information is an inherent problem in committee decision-making. In the recruitment
example, information about candidate qualications is dispersed in the committee because
committee members have dierent perspectives or abilities to evaluate research in dierent
elds. Since assessments are private, the committee decision can depend only on members'
reports about their information, not on the actual information. Conicting interests and
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private information give rise to strategic considerations that cause members to exaggerate
their information.
In section II we show that information cannot be fully shared among committee mem-
bers under these circumstances. Ecient sharing requires that the committee decision
respond to small changes in any member's data. This property fails in an equilibrium
of any decision-making procedure. Incentive compatibility implies that continuous data
observed by each person are partitioned and transformed into rank order categories. Per-
fect inference of private information is impossible. Obfuscation is the rule rather than the
exception in committees. The partitioning of continuous data into ordered categories can
be interpreted as equilibrium outcomes of voting procedures. Voting is the equilibrium
method of reaching decisions in committees. It coarsens the transmission of information
among committee members, but is necessary to control strategic manipulations that arise
from conicts of interest.
Section III analyzes two-way partitions in detail. This corresponds to the equilibrium
outcome of a simple voting procedure where each member votes \yes" or \no" depending
on whether or not the strength of his private evidence exceeds a personal threshold. The
voting equilibrium is suboptimal because information is garbled and the thresholds are
chosen strategically rather than cooperatively. In the recruitment example, anticipating
manipulation of evidence by fellow committee members, an individual \exaggerates" own
evidence that the candidate in his eld produces high quality research by voting \yes" to
his favored candidate even though he would have voted \no" with the same evidence were
all information truthfully revealed. He lowers his own hiring bar because he knows that
other members will raise theirs.
Incentives for manipulation and counter-manipulation thus generate a larger area of
disagreement among members than is implied by their inherent conicts in preferences.
The ex ante welfare of each individual committee member decreases as the preferences of
fellow members diverge further away from his. When the preferences of fellow members
are suciently extreme, the benets to an individual member from sharing information
under a given voting procedure can be outweighed by distortions in the committee. Still,
equilibrium exaggeration is limited, and information is aggregated by the committee, albeit
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imperfectly. The area of disagreement is bounded from above by the need for members
to share their private information. Regardless of personal preferences, each committee
member casts the decisive vote less frequently than if he were to make the decision based
on his information only. Moreover, if some committee members are known to have more
conclusive evidence, others cast their deciding votes less frequently. Better informed mem-
bers are decisive more often. Indeed, when the committee rule is chosen appropriately,
gains from sharing information outweigh distortions from information manipulation for all
members regardless of the extent of conicts in the committee.
The voting model is used to analyze abstention in section IV. Although members
always have incentives to inuence the committee decision to advance their own interests,
the gains from information sharing may be so large that it is in a member's self interest to
abstain when his private information is relatively uninformative. Abstention improves the
quality of committee decisions. Voting with abstention is equivalent to a generalized voting
procedure that allows each committee member to choose from three categories. Section
V studies voting procedures with more categories that allow ner partitions of data and
more ecient utilization of private information. Conicting interests among committee
members impose an upper bound on how ne information partitioning can be. Great
conicts within the committee make ne partitions impossible.
I. A Model of Committee Decision-making
We discuss the problem of strategic information aggregation in the context of hy-
pothesis testing given the data. A committee must decide whether to accept or reject a
null hypothesis. For example, a hiring committee must decide whether the candidate is
qualied (the null) or unqualied, or a management committee must decide if an invest-
ment project is worth undertaking (the null) or not. In a criminal trial jury, the null is
that the suspect is innocent. In these situations of binary states and binary decisions, the
choice of the null hypothesis is arbitrary and unessential to our results, but it facilitates
the discussion.
For simplicity, we consider a committee of two persons, A and B. Member A's prior
that the null is true is 
a
, and the personal costs of type I error (false acceptance) and type
{ 4 {
II error (false rejection) are 
a
1
and 
a
2
respectively. Let k
a
1
= 
a
1
(1   
a
) and k
a
2
= 
a
2

a
.
The ratio k
a
= k
a
1
=k
a
2
represents the cost of false acceptance relative to false rejection.
A greater k
a
means that A is more prone to reject. There is no dierence in this model
between bias as manifested in  and preference as manifested in ; only the ratio k
a
matters. The notation for member B's preference is similar. Conicts in the committee
exist whenever k
a
6= k
b
, but interests of committee members are not directly opposed as
long as k
a
and k
b
are strictly positive and nite so that both care about false acceptance
and false rejection. We assume that k
a
and k
b
are common knowledge.
Information about the decision is diverse in the committee. Member A receives a
private observation, a real number y
a
that is realization of a random variable Y
a
. We
assume that Y
a
is distributed on a subset [y
a
; y
a
] of IR, with continuous density functions
f
a
q
() if the null is true and f
a
u
() if the null is false. The corresponding distribution functions
are F
a
q
() and F
a
u
(). Member B's information structure is similarly denoted. The random
variables Y
a
and Y
b
are independently distributed conditional on the true state. This is a
particular way of modeling the idea that committee members have dierent evidence due
to dierences in perspectives and capabilities in evaluating the information.
If the data are publicly observable, the optimal committee decision is a standard
hypothesis testing problem.
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By the assumption of conditional independence, given any
decision rule of accepting the null hypothesis with probability p(y
a
; y
b
) when the data are
(y
a
; y
b
), the expected cost to each member (j = a; b) (before the data are received) is given
by
(1) (1  
j
)
j
1
Z
p(y
a
; y
b
)f
a
u
(y
a
)f
b
u
(y
b
)dy
a
dy
b
+ 
j

j
2
Z
[1  p(y
a
; y
b
)]f
a
q
(y
a
)f
b
q
(y
b
)dy
a
dy
b
:
Under the optimal decision rule, p
a
(y
a
; y
b
) minimizes the weighted costs of A and B. Let
positive numbers 
a
and 
b
be relative weights for A and B, and dene k
1
= 
a
k
a
1
+
b
k
b
1
and k
2
= 
a
k
a
2
+ 
b
k
b
2
. Then, the optimal decision rule is given by p(y
a
; y
b
) = 1 if y
a
and
y
b
satisfy
(2) l
a
(y
a
)l
b
(y
b
)  k
1
=k
2
;
and p(y
a
; y
b
) = 0 otherwise, where l
j
is the likelihood ratio f
j
q
=f
j
u
for each j = a; b.
Throughout this paper, we assume the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) that
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lj
() is strictly increasing. This assumption simplies our analysis, and is standard in
the literature (see, e.g., Milgrom, 1981).
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MLRP implies that the optimal decision rule
is deterministic and strictly monotone in the observations y
a
and y
b
. In other words,
the optimal decision rule can be represented by a \decision function" S that is strictly
increasing in each of the two arguments y
a
and y
b
, so that the decision is acceptance if
and only if S(y
a
; y
b
)  0. As illustrated in Figure 1, the optimal decision rule partitions
the data space into an acceptance region and a rejection region, with a strictly downward
sloping boundary between them dened by S(y
a
; y
b
) = 0. The null hypothesis is accepted
when the data lie above the boundary, and is rejected when the data lie below it.
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The characterization of the optimal decision rule in equation (2) applies to individual
decision-making as well. If member A has access to both Y
a
and Y
b
, then his optimal
decision rule is to accept the null if and only if
(3) l
a
(y
a
)l
b
(y
b
)  k
a
:
MLRP implies that the personal optimal decision rule for each member is deterministic
and strictly increasing in y
a
and y
b
, but diers from the weighted optimal rule when the
two members have conicting interests (k
a
6= k
b
). If the decision function S
j
(j = a; b)
represents member j's personal optimal decision rule, then (2) and (3) imply that there
is no intersection between S
a
(y
a
; y
b
) = 0 and S
b
(y
a
; y
b
) = 0 in the data space. Figure 1
illustrates the case where A has a lower standard of acceptance than B (k
a
< k
b
). The
region between S
a
= 0 and S
b
= 0 is the disagreement zone: for the same data (y
a
; y
b
) in
the region, A prefers to accept and B prefers to reject. The size of the disagreement zone
measures how much the members dier in preference and prior. The dierence between the
members' personal optimal decision rules is the source of their incentives to misrepresent
their own evidence and attempt to tilt the committee decision to their own preferences
when evidence is not publicly observed.
II. Manipulation Leads to Garbling
Since information is private, committee decisions are made on the basis of members'
reports of their private data. Let us rst consider a Bayesian game where the two members
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report r
a
and r
b
simultaneously after learning their private evidence y
a
and y
b
, and the
decision is made according to the rule \accept if and only if S(r
a
; r
b
)  0." It is easy to
see that truthful reporting is not an equilibrium strategy as long as k
a
6= k
b
. In this case,
the two personal optimal decision functions S
a
and S
b
dier from the committee decision
function S. Suppose B always reports his observation y
b
truthfully. Member A does not
know the value of B's observation when he submits his report and treats B's report as
the random variable Y
b
. If A submits report r
a
, the null is accepted if the realization y
b
is such that S(r
a
; y
b
)  0. But conditional on y
a
, member A prefers to accept whenever
y
b
satises S
a
(y
a
; y
b
)  0. Since S diers from S
a
, reporting r
a
= y
a
is not optimal for
member A.
Figure 1 illustrates the optimal report for member A conditional on his evidence y
a
when k
a
< k
b
. Member A is biased toward acceptance relative to the committee decision
function S. Conditional on y
a
, the committee decision is to accept if y
b
 y
2
, but A prefers
to accept if y
b
 y
1
. If B reports his observations truthfully, member A achieves his lower
standard of acceptance by overstating the case for acceptance and reporting r
1
. Similarly,
B has incentives to understate the case for acceptance if A reports truthfully.
The result of nonexistence of truth-telling equilibrium can be generalized. As long
as the two members A and B commit to a deterministic and strictly monotone rule such
as the one represented by S, truth-telling is not an equilibrium. Moreover, given any
deterministic and strictly monotone rule, there exists no manipulation equilibrium where
members use invertible reporting strategies that allow perfect inference of their private
data. The nonexistence of equilibrium with invertible strategies in reporting games with
deterministic and strictly monotone rules illustrates the incentives to garble private infor-
mation in committee decision-making. Indeed, since our argument depends only on the
local characteristics of the reporting strategies, there exists no equilibrium with partially
invertible strategies (i.e., reporting functions that are invertible for some interval in the
support of the evidence). Garbling occurs everywhere.
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These generalizations can be made precise and strengthened further from a mechanism
design perspective. A limitation of the result above is that it refers to a particular decision-
making procedure, where each member is free to report any observation and a deterministic
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and strictly monotone decision rule maps the reported observations to the decisions. What
will happen in equilibrium under commitments to dierent ways of making decisions? To
answer this, the result has to be restated in a way that is independent of the particular
information-reporting game. This requires side-stepping the game and the equilibrium
strategy and directly examining how the private data are transformed into decisions in the
data space.
Formally, a \decision mechanism" here is a commitment by A and B to a \report
space" for each member that denes all the reports he can choose, and a \committee rule"
that maps a vector of reports to a decision. Since the report spaces and the committee
rule can be arbitrary, the concept of a decision mechanism captures all possible ways for
the committee to make a decision. The Bayesian reporting game considered above denes
a \direct decision mechanism," because each member's report is conned to the range of
the observations. One can easily imagine \indirect mechanisms" where members' reports
are not restricted to this range. For example, a voting procedure is an indirect mechanism
because the report space for each committee member consists of two votes, yes and no.
Whether direct or indirect, if a decision-making mechanism has an equilibrium, then the
equilibrium denes an \outcome," a mapping from the data space to the decision that is
a combination of the equilibrium strategies and the committee rule.
The outcome of ecient information sharing represented in formula (2) is deterministic
and strictly monotone. A deterministic outcome divides data space into acceptance and
rejection regions. A deterministic and strictly monotone outcome has a boundary that
is a strictly decreasing function in the data space, such as S = 0 in Figure 1. Another
possibility is a deterministic but everywhere weakly monotone outcome, represented by a
boundary that is a decreasing step function, as in Figure 2. This is called a \partition
outcome," because continuous data of each member are transformed into ordered ranks or
categories through partitioning by thresholds. Categorizing data is a particular form of
information garbling that restricts information in a natural way and prevents full revelation
of private evidence. Applying the revelation principle (due to Roger Myerson (1979) in
Bayesian games, and to Gibbard (1973), Partha Dasgupta, Peter Hammond and Eric
Maskin (1979), and Milton Harris and Robert Townsend (1981) in other contexts), we can
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exclude any deterministic outcome whose boundary has a strictly decreasing segment as
an equilibrium outcome.
7
The proof of the following proposition, which can be found in
the appendix, formalizes the observation that the argument used at the beginning of this
section to show that truth-telling is not an equilibrium in the reporting game with decision
function S, remains valid under any deterministic committee rule that is strictly monotone
in a neighborhood of some data point (y
a
; y
b
).
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose that the two members have conicting interests (k
a
6= k
b
).
Then deterministic and monotone equilibrium outcomes of any decision mechanism are
partition outcomes.
Committee decision-making can be accomplished only by categorizing private data.
Coarsening information through ordered categories controls private incentives to exagger-
ate the strength of one's private evidence while at the same time aording opportunities
to pool everyone's evidence. There is a trade-o between information sharing and ma-
nipulation. Later we show that how this trade-o is resolved depends on a priori conict
among the members. The greater the latent consensus among members, the greater are
the opportunities for presenting private data in ner categories and greater detail.
Proposition 1 gives a strong sense that we derive \voting" with categories as a neces-
sary method to achieve consensus in committee decision-making. This is the clearest when
partition outcomes involve two categories. In section III they are constructed as equilib-
rium outcomes of voting games, where each member votes \accept" or \reject," and a rule
stipulates how many votes are needed to accept the null hypothesis. Section IV modies
the voting games to allow abstention, which corresponds to partition outcomes with three
categories for each member.
8
Section V considers voting games with generalized procedures
where each member can choose an integer score from a given scale (say, 1 to 10), and a
prespecied scoring rule aggregates the scores and compares the sum to a given threshold
(say, 9.5) to yield a committee decision. The equilibrium outcomes in these voting games
correspond to partition outcomes with multiple categories.
The result that manipulation arising from conicting interests leads to information
garbling is closely related to Crawford and Sobel's (1982) work on cheap talk games. They
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show that when the preferred decision of a privately informed expert always diers from
that of an uninformed decision-maker, the expert's continuous data must be partitioned
before being used by the decision-maker. In our model committee decisions are binary
instead of continuous, so committee members do not always dier. Yet partition outcomes
with multiple categories arise in a similar way. To see this, imagine that in our model
memberA submits a report of his data to B, who chooses between acceptance and rejection
based on the report and his own data. Think of B's decision as a threshold level of his data
above which the null is accepted, which is a continuous decision variable. Then, A and B
always dier in B's decision for any data ofA: in Figure 1 where we assume k
a
< k
b
, for any
data of member A, the preferred decision of B is the corresponding point on S
b
= 0, which
is greater than the preferred decision of A (the corresponding point on S
a
= 0). Thus,
we obtain a version of Crawford and Sobel's model by modifying our model and assuming
that one member reports to another who makes the decision. Of course, in our original
model the two members play symmetric roles, so while the modied model shows that the
formal analytical structure is similar in our model and in Crawford and Sobel's model, it
also demonstrates the main dierence between the two: private information is strategically
aggregated in a committee instead of being transmitted from an expert to an uninformed
decision-maker. Indeed, if in our model only one member has private information, then
one can demonstrate that in any equilibrium outcome this member can partition his data
into at most two categories, as there is no credible way for him to convey the strength of
his evidence. In our present model with two privately informed members, their common
interests in sharing information create potential opportunities to present private data in
more categories and ner detail.
III. Voting as Equilibrium Garbling
This section considers voting games in which each member chooses between \accept"
or \reject." Two dierent voting procedures are possible: \unilateral acceptance" where
the hypothesis is accepted if there is at least one \accept" vote, and \unilateral rejection"
where acceptance requires two \accept" votes. Each procedure denes a dierent voting
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game, with an equilibrium in which each member votes \accept" when his observation is
above a threshold. An equilibrium with such threshold strategies results in a partition
outcome with two categories.
A. Characterization of the two-category equilibria
For each j = a; b, denote L
j

= F
j
q
=F
j
u
and L
j

= (1   F
j
q
)=(1   F
j
u
). Suppose that there
exist a pair of thresholds (t
a

; t
b

) that satisfy
(4)
l
a
(t
a

)L
b

(t
b

) = k
a
;
l
b
(t
b

)L
a

(t
a

) = k
b
:
Similarly, suppose that a pair of thresholds (t
a

; t
b

) satisfy
(5)
l
a
(t
a

)L
b

(t
b

) = k
a
;
l
b
(t
b

)L
a

(t
a

) = k
b
:
Consider unilateral acceptance; the case of unilateral rejection is similar. Suppose that
member B adopts the strategy of voting \accept" if and only if y
b
 t
b

. Given an ob-
servation y
a
, to member A the probability that the null hypothesis is true is 
a
f
a
q
(y
a
),
and the probability that it is false is (1   
a
)f
a
u
(y
a
), where  equals the reciprocal of

a
f
a
q
(y
a
) + (1   
a
)f
a
u
(y
a
). Member A ensures acceptance by voting \accept." His ex-
pected cost (from false acceptance) is k
a
1
f
a
u
(y
a
). If he votes \reject" instead, the verdict
depends on B's vote. From A's point of view, the null will be wrongly accepted with
probability 1   F
b
u
(t
b

), and wrongly rejected with probability F
b
q
(t
b

). Member A's total
expected cost from the two types of errors is then k
a
1
f
a
u
(y
a
)[1 F
b
u
(t
b

)]+k
a
2
f
a
q
(y
a
)F
b
q
(t
b

).
Comparing the costs of these two votes shows that \accept" is preferred to \reject" if and
only if l
a
(y
a
)L
b

(t
b

)  k
a
. By MLRP and the denition of the thresholds t
a

and t
b

, \ac-
cept" is preferred to \reject" if and only if y
a
 t
a

. The argument for B is symmetric. We
have proved the following:
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose that there exist thresholds t
j

and t
j

(j = a; b) that satisfy (4)
and (5). Then, in the voting game with unilateral acceptance, there is an equilibriumwhere
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each member j votes \accept" if and only if y
j
 t
j

; in the voting game with unilateral
rejection, there is an equilibrium where each j votes \accept" if and only if y
j
 t
j

.
The equilibrium conditions (4) and (5) in the voting games can be understood in terms
of a \pivotal voting" argument (Austen-Smith and Banks, 1996; Feddersen and Pesendor-
fer, 1997).
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In our model, strategic voting requires that each member choose his vote as
if it were pivotal. With unilateral acceptance, A's vote is pivotal if B votes for rejection,
which occurs when y
b
< t
b

. The likelihood ratio for the event that A's observation is y
a
and y
b
< t
b

is given by l
a
(y
a
)L
b

(t
b

). This represents the relative probability of the null
is true to the null is false. The voting strategy for A is to accept if l
a
(y
a
)L
b

(t
b

) exceeds
k
a
, the relative costs of false acceptance and false rejection. To see why pivotal voting is
optimal is to consider how members choose the threshold rule before receiving the obser-
vations. Anticipating that B uses a voting strategy with threshold t
b

, member A chooses
t
a
to minimize the expected cost k
a
1
[1   F
a
u
(t
a
)F
b
u
(t
b

)] + k
a
2
F
a
q
(t
a
)F
b
q
(t
b

). In the above
expression, member A's choice of threshold t
a
aects his expected cost only when y
b
< t
b

.
The rst order condition for an optimal threshold t
a
is precisely (4).
Information aggregation with discontinuous data and strategic voting is analyzed in
a series of interesting papers by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and Feddersen and Pe-
sendorfer (1996; 1997; 1998).
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In their model, private signals are binary, a feature that
limits their analysis of information manipulation to mixed strategies. Our model diers in
several respects. By using an information structure with continuously distributed private
observations, we are able to study a richer set of information manipulations in committee
decision-making. Instead of the mixed-strategy equilibria of Feddersen and Pesendorfer,
we characterize partition outcomes and analyze obfuscation, exaggeration, and abstention
as distinctive forms of evidence manipulation. More importantly, we do not impose voting
as the collective decision procedure. We start with an information aggregation procedure
that is optimal in the absence of strategic manipulation and derive voting as an equilibrium
outcome of information garbling. In the following analysis of the two-category equilibrium
outcomes, we go beyond the pivotal voting argument of Feddersen and Pesendorfer, em-
phasizing the role of conicting interests in committee decision-making, and addressing
how conicts in the committee aect manipulation and sharing of information.
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For unilateral acceptance, equations (4) dene reaction functions in the (t
a
; t
b
) plane,
and determine the equilibrium thresholds. MLRP implies that L
j

() is increasing, and
the two reaction functions are downward sloping. Equilibrium exists under appropriate
boundary conditions on the likelihood ratios. Suppose that for each j = a; b, there exists
a nite, proper subset [y
j
min
; y
j
max
] of the support [y
j
; y
j
] of Y
j
such that
(6)
l
a
(y
a
min
)L
b

(y
b
max
) < k
a
< l
a
(y
a
max
)L
b

(y
b
min
);
l
b
(y
b
min
)L
a

(y
a
max
) < k
b
< l
b
(y
b
max
)L
a

(y
a
min
):
Under these conditions, MLRP implies that A's reaction function is dened for any t
b
2
[y
b
min
; y
b
max
], and vice versa for B. Then, the Brouwer xed-point theorem applies to
equations (4) and proves that an equilibrium exists on [y
a
min
; y
a
max
] [y
b
min
; y
b
max
]. As long
as the likelihood ratios l
j
are unbounded (i.e., l
j
is arbitrarily large at y
j
and l
j
is arbitrarily
close to zero at y
j
), one can appropriately select the nite intervals [y
j
min
; y
j
max
] to satisfy
(6). For example, when Y
j
is normally distributed with a shift of the mean conditional on
the true state of the null hypothesis, an equilibrium exists regardless of k
a
and k
b
.
A sucient condition for a unique intersection is that one reaction function is steeper
than the other one whenever the two functions intersect. This condition is satised if the
ratio l
j
()=L
j

() is monotone. Throughout this section, we maintain the assumption that
l
j
()=L
j

() is strictly increasing on [y
j
; y
j
]. Under this assumption A's reaction function is
steeper than B's when they intersect. Then, the equilibrium is unique and globally \sta-
ble," in a pseudo-dynamic sense that starting from any initial values the trajectory of the
two thresholds converges to the intersection of the reaction curves. As is the case for many
static games, stability in the pseudo-dynamic sense produces comparative statics results
that are easy to understand (Avinash Dixit, 1986). Figure 3 depicts the reaction functions
for the case where conditional on the true state Y
a
and Y
b
are normally distributed. This
case satises the assumption that l
j
()=L
j

() is increasing.
The case of unilateral rejection is analogous. MLRP implies that L
j

() is increasing.
Conditions similar to (6) guarantee that there exist t
a

and t
b

that satisfy (5). As in
the case of unilateral acceptance, the assumption that the ratio l
j
()=L
j

() is increasing
is sucient to ensure that equilibrium is unique and stable. For example, when Y
j
is
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normally distributed conditional on the true state, both l
j
=L
j

and l
j
=L
j

are increasing.
In this case, there is a unique and stable equilibrium both in unilateral acceptance and in
unilateral rejection.
B. Information manipulation and information sharing
This section presents a few comparative statics results for the voting game and il-
lustrates the tension between information manipulation and information sharing. From
equations (4) under unilateral acceptance, since l
j
=L
j

is increasing, if Y
a
and Y
b
have the
same conditional distributions, then k
a
< k
b
implies t
a

< t
b

. That is, if member A is more
biased toward acceptance than member B, then A's equilibrium threshold for acceptance
is lower than B's. For the same observation value y
a
= y
b
= y, member A votes for
acceptance while B votes for rejection if y is between t
a

and t
b

. Therefore jt
a

  t
b

j can be
thought of as the \area of disagreement" between the two members.
Since l
j
=L
j

is increasing, dt
a

=dk
b
< 0 and dt
b

=dk
b
> 0, so the area of disagreement
increases as conict of interests, jk
a
  k
b
j, increases. As B becomes more biased toward
rejection and his standard for acceptance increases, A counters by lower his own standard.
This inducesB to raise t
b

further. The increase in t
b

can be decomposed into two parts: one
due to the shift of B's reaction function, and the other due to a move along B's reaction
function because t
a

decreases. See Figure 3. The second part shows that the area of
disagreement in committee decision-making is larger than that implied by inherent conicts
in preferences: strategic manipulation by one member leads to counter-manipulation by
the other. Conicts lead to the exaggeration. When B is more biased toward rejection
than A, memberB raises his threshold not only because of the concern for false acceptance,
but also to balance A's opposite tendency to vote \accept." Member B votes for rejection
more often than in the absence of information manipulation by A.
Although conicts cause manipulation, incentives to exaggerate evidence are balanced
in equilibrium by incentives to share information. Comparing the equilibrium with how
each member would make the decision based on his own private information illustrates
sharing of information in the committee. If a member makes the decision alone, the
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optimal decision is acceptance if and only if his evidence y
j
(j = a; b) exceeds a threshold
^
t
j
determined by
(7) l
j
(
^
t
j
) = k
j
:
Compare (7) with (4). Since L
j

() < 1,
^
t
j
is lower than t
j

. When j observes evidence y
j
between
^
t
j
and t
j

, he votes for rejection in the committee even though he would have chosen
acceptance if he were the only decision-maker. Member j thus utilizes the information
of the other member by casting the decisive \accept" vote less frequently. Note that
this is true independent of member j's preferences. Even if member j is strongly biased
toward acceptance, the need to utilize the other member's information still makes him
more \conservative" towards acceptance. In the case of unilateral rejection, the decisive
vote is rejection instead of acceptance: each member utilizes the information of the other
member by voting for rejection less frequently than if the decision were made on the basis
of own information.
Incentives to share information under conicting interests can also be examined by
considering how voting behavior changes when quality of the observation received by one
member, sayB, becomes higher. If evidence were public, higher quality data receive greater
weight in the decision rule.
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But since evidence is private, changes in weights can be easily
undone by information manipulation. Instead, changes in information quality changes
equilibrium thresholds. Consider a modication of the information structure available to
members. Member B still observes Y
b
. Member A observes Y
a
with probability 1 , and
observes the true state of the null hypothesis with probability . An increase in  improves
the quality of A's data. The pivotal event that A votes \reject" now has a likelihood ratio
~
L
a

given by
(8)
~
L
a

=
(1  )F
a
q
(t
a

)
 + (1  )F
a
u
(t
a

)
:
From equation (4), since
~
L
a

is decreasing in , an increase in  causes B's reaction function
to shift upwards. The eect is that t
a

decreases and t
b

increases. See Figure 3. The
interpretation is straightforward. Voting for acceptance decides the verdict regardless of
the value of the other member's observation. Voting for rejection, on the other hand, defers
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the decision to the other member. When A gains access to data of a higher quality, B
takes advantage of the improved information by raising t
b

and deferring the decision to A,
so A is decisive more often.
The analysis is symmetric for the case of unilateral rejection. Given the modied
information structure, the likelihood ratio for the event that A votes for acceptance is
(9)
~
L
a

=
 + (1  )[1  F
a
q
(t
a

)]
(1   )[1   F
a
u
(t
a

)]
:
An increase in  increases
~
L
a

, so t
a

rises and t
b

falls. Voting for rejection decides the
case. Member B avoids submitting a decisive vote in order to take advantage of the higher
quality of A's evidence. He lowers t
b

and votes for rejection less often.
C. Delegation versus committee decision-making
Conicts reduce welfare because strategic manipulation reduces eciency of informa-
tion aggregation. To see this, note that the extent of divergence in preferences jk
a
  k
b
j
directly aects expected cost to each member in the voting game. With unilateral accep-
tance, equilibrium expected cost to member A is
(10) C
a

= k
a
1
[1  F
a
u
(t
a

)F
b
u
(t
b

)] + k
a
2
F
a
q
(t
a

)F
b
q
(t
b

):
Dierentiating with respect to k
b
, we have
(11)
dC
a

dk
b
= [ k
a
1
f
b
u
(t
b

)F
a
u
(t
a

) + k
a
2
f
b
q
(t
b

)F
a
q
(t
a

)]
dt
b

dk
b
:
From the equilibrium condition (4) for memberA, since dt
b

=dk
b
> 0 when l
j
=L
j

is increas-
ing, dC
a

=dk
b
has the same sign as k
b
  k
a
. For example, if k
a
< k
b
, a further increase in
k
b
raises member A's expected cost in the equilibrium. Equation (11) shows that dC
a

=dt
b

has the same sign as k
b
  k
a
. Similarly dC
b

=dt
a

has the same sign as k
a
  k
b
. If k
a
= k
b
,
equilibrium thresholds minimize the expected cost to both members. But if k
a
< k
b
for
example, the expected cost to both members would fall if A's threshold increased and B's
decreased. Thus, strategic manipulation implies that equilibrium thresholds are Pareto
inecient.
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Since conicting preferences reduce welfare, are the gains from information sharing
sucient to outweigh the losses from strategic voting? To answer this question, we compare
committee decision-making to delegation of the decision to one member. Let
^
C
a
denote A's
expected cost when he alone makes the decision based on his own information. Then
^
C
a
=
k
a
1
[1 F
a
u
(
^
t
a
)]+k
a
2
F
a
q
(
^
t
a
), where the optimal threshold
^
t
a
satises condition (7). Consider
the dierence D
a
= C
a

 
^
C
a
as a function of k
b
. We showed above that dC
a

=dk
b
< 0 for
k
b
< k
a
and dC
a

=dk
b
> 0 for k
b
> k
a
. Since
^
C
a
is independent of k
b
, the dierence D
a
decreases for k
b
< k
a
and then increases for k
b
> k
a
, reaching a minimum at k
b
= k
a
.
In the limiting case where k
b
approaches innity, member B always votes for rejection
and lets member A make the decision. Therefore, D
a
= 0. At the other limit, when
k
b
approaches zero, B ensures acceptance by himself. Member A's expected cost is then
simply k
a
1
, and the dierence D
a
is given by k
a
1
F
a
u
(
^
t
a
)   k
a
2
F
a
q
(
^
t
a
). By the denition of
^
t
a
, we have k
a
1
f
a
u
(y
a
) > k
a
2
f
a
q
(y
a
) for all y
a
<
^
t
a
. Integrating over the range y
a

^
t
a
then
establishes that D
a
> 0 when k
b
approaches zero.
Figure 4 shows that D
a
is negative at k
b
= k
a
: with no conict of preferences, com-
mittee decision-making dominates do-it-alone decision-making because more information
is better. It shows also that for A committee decision-making continues to dominate so
long as B is relatively biased toward rejection (k
b
> k
a
), because the unilateral accep-
tance rule allows A to control the acceptance decision while at the same time deferring
to B when the latter has strong evidence for rejection. Moreover, if k
b
> k
a
then B
also prefers the committee decision to delegation to A. The reason is that A controls
the decision process in both cases but with committee decision-making B's information is
sometimes used.
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Thus, delegation from a member biased toward rejection to a member
biased toward acceptance is Pareto dominated by unilateral acceptance.
When the committee rule is unilateral rejection, the decisive vote is rejection. Com-
mittee decision-making allows the member who is relatively biased toward rejection to
control the decision process. Unilateral rejection therefore dominates delegation of the
decision to a member relatively biased toward rejection. When the committee rule can be
chosen, delegation is Pareto dominated regardless of preferences of committee members.
D. Voting procedures and voting behavior
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This section compares the equilibrium with unilateral acceptance to the equilibrium
with unilateral rejection. It might seem that requiring two votes for acceptance instead of
one is a more \stringent" standard of proof. But this statement ignores strategic responses
to the voting procedure. When unanimity in acceptance is required, each member lowers
his threshold for acceptance and votes for acceptance less cautiously, because he knows
that the other member may have information that will lead to a vote against acceptance.
On the other hand, if acceptance is unilateral, each member is more cautious in casting a
vote for acceptance, because such a vote would be decisive regardless of the other member's
information. More precisely, MLRP implies that for each j = a; b, L
j

() < 1 and L
j

() > 1.
It then follows from conditions (4) and (5) that t
j

> t
j

.
The above result is illustrated in Figure 5. Under unilateral acceptance, the hypothe-
sis is accepted unless the data lie in the region below both of the two lines through t
a

and
t
b

. With unilateral rejection, it is accepted only when the data lie in the region above both
lines through t
a

and t
b

. Since the two regions overlap, the comparison between unilat-
eral acceptance and unilateral rejection depends on the precise shapes of the conditional
distributions of Y
a
and Y
b
. In particular, unanimous acceptance does not necessarily lead
to lower acceptance rates.
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The extent of conict aects members' preference over voting procedures. When
interests are identical, the two members agree on which procedure should be used. By
continuity, small dierences in preference do not generate disagreement about the ex ante
choice of voting procedure. However, as conicts increase, strategic manipulations of
information amplify the dierences in personal preference over voting procedures. For
a numerical example, let F
q
 N(0; 1) and F
u
 N(1; 1) be the common distribution
functions, conditional on the true state. If the common preference k exceeds 1, both
members prefer unilateral rejection to unilateral acceptance. Now, consider the following
parameterization: k
a
1
= k   d, k
b
1
= k + d, and k
a
2
= k
b
2
= 1. As d increases from 0
to k, k
a
decreases and k
b
increases. Dene a \cooperative" threshold

t

under unilateral
acceptance by the equation l(

t

)L

(

t

) = k. With this specication,

t

minimizes the
equally-weighted sum of expected costs to the two members under unilateral acceptance,
regardless of the extent of conicts d. Similarly, dene the cooperative threshold

t

under
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unilateral rejection according to l(

t

)L

(

t

) = k. Figure 6 (with k = 2) illustrates how
each member j's preference over plurality changes with d, as measured by the ratio of
expected cost

C
j

under unilateral acceptance to cost

C
j

under unilateral rejection.
With cooperative thresholds, member B's preference for unilateral rejection becomes
stronger as he becomes more biased toward rejection (

C
b

=

C
b

increases with d). Member
A's preference over the two procedures, shown by

C
a

=

C
a

, initially coincides with B's,
but switches to unilateral acceptance as he becomes more concerned with false rejection.
In Figure 6 this happens around d = 1:36. In contrast, equilibrium manipulation implies
a larger dierence in personal preference over voting procedures. Figure 6 also plots the
ratio of each member j's equilibrium expected cost C
j

under unilateral acceptance to the
cost C
j

under unilateral rejection. As with cooperative decision-making, the dierence
between C
b

=C
b

and C
a

=C
a

becomes greater as d increases, but the divergence grows
much faster. Member A switches his preferred voting procedure from unilateral rejection
to unilateral acceptance around d = 0:38.
IV. Abstention
This section allows committee members to abstain in the voting games, which corre-
sponds to a three-way partition of each member's data. Abstention improves the quality
of decision-making in equilibrium, because it allows each member to signal that his data
are inconclusive and reduces harmful strategic manipulations. This result is obtained for
the case of unilateral acceptance. The case of unilateral rejection is symmetric.
We need to specify what happens when both members abstain. The simplest way is
to specify a \default decision" when both abstain. If the default is rejection, abstention
is equivalent to voting for rejection and has no eect on the equilibrium. But suppose
the default is acceptance. Then a vote for rejection by A results in acceptance only if B
votes for acceptance, while abstention by A results in acceptance when B either votes for
acceptance or abstains. Now equilibrium strategies involve two thresholds, t
j
1
< t
j
2
, such
that a member strategy votes \accept" if y
j
 t
j
2
, votes \reject" if y
j
< t
j
1
, and abstains if
t
j
2
> y
j
 t
j
1
.
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For each j = a; b and any y
j
2
> y
j
1
, denote the ratio [F
j
q
(y
j
2
) F
j
q
(y
j
1
)]=[F
j
u
(y
j
2
) F
j
u
(y
j
1
)]
as L
j
(y
j
2
; y
j
1
). Using similar reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 2, we can show that
the thresholds for A satisfy:
(12)
l
a
(t
a
1
)L
b
(t
b
2
; t
b
1
) = k
a
;
l
a
(t
a
2
)L
b

(t
b
1
) = k
a
:
A symmetric pair of equations holds for B. The term L
b
(t
b
2
; t
b
1
) in the rst equation of
(12) is the likelihood ratio for the event that B abstains. In that case, A can guarantee
rejection only if he votes for rejection. The term L
b

(t
b
1
) in the second equation is the
likelihood ratio for the event that B votes for rejection, when A can guarantee rejection if
he abstains. MLRP implies that L
j
(t
j
2
; t
j
1
) > l
j
(t
j
1
) > L
j

(t
j
1
). Then, if t
b
2
> t
b
1
, (12) implies
that t
a
2
> t
a
1
, and vice versa. Thus, the thresholds (t
a
1
; t
a
2
; t
b
1
; t
b
2
) dened by (12) form an
equilibrium of the voting game. We assume that the equilibrium exists and is unique.
Comparing the thresholds in the equilibrium with abstention with the equilibrium
thresholds without abstention shows that allowing abstention makes committee members
more \careful" in casting their votes. Formally, for each j = a; b, we have t
j
2
> t
j

> t
j
1
(the
proof is in the appendix). Thus, if the evidence is not very strong either way, a member
chooses to abstain.
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Standards of evidence for voting for acceptance or for rejection are
raised so that the probability of voting either way is reduced for both members. Eciency
in information sharing improves. The proof is in the appendix.
PROPOSITION 3: Equilibrium expected cost to each member in the voting game with
abstention is lower than that in the voting game without abstention.
With conicts in the committee, allowing abstention reduces the tension. Finer par-
titioning of information improves the welfare of each member of the committee. However,
ner partitions are possible only when conicts are bounded: Proposition 3 assumes that
an equilibrium exists with three-categories, but the existence depends on the extent of
conicts. If conicts are too great, three-category equilibrium outcomes do not exist and
allowing abstention has no eect on committee decisions. We show this point next.
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V. More Categories
This section shows that the degree of conict among members limits the neness of
data partitioning under any decision mechanism. For expositional convenience, we consider
a voting game with a specic scoring rule that implements a unilateral acceptance outcome
withN thresholds andN+1 categories for each member. Each member chooses an (integer)
score from 0 to N . The committee decision is \acceptance" if the sum of the two scores
is greater than N  
1
2
and \rejection" otherwise. We construct an equilibrium where each
member j (j = a; b) uses an N-threshold strategy, such that for each n = 0; : : : ;N , the
score n is chosen if y
j
2 [t
j
n
; t
j
n+1
), where t
j
1
; : : : ; t
j
N
are the N thresholds (t
j
0
= y
j
and
t
j
N+1
= y
j
are dened as the lower and upper bound of the support of Y
j
.) Each member
can convey the strength of his evidence by choosing dierent scores. A score of N ensures
acceptance regardless of the other score, while a score of n  N   1 results in acceptance
only when the other score is at least N   n.
Deriving conditions for thresholds in the (N + 1)-category equilibrium is a straight-
forward extension of the proof of Proposition 2. By construction, for each n = 1; : : : ;N , a
choice between two scores n  1 and n for member A is pivotal only if member B chooses
N  n: if A chooses n 1 rejection results, and if he chooses n acceptance results. Member
A therefore makes the choice between the two scores conditional on his evidence y
a
and
on B's choice of N   n (that is, on y
b
2 [t
b
N n
; t
b
N n+1
)). See Figure 2. The expected
cost to A from choosing n is k
a
1
f
a
u
(y
a
)[F
b
u
(t
b
N n+1
) F
b
u
(t
b
N n
)], and from choosing n  1
is k
a
2
f
a
q
(y
a
)[F
b
q
(t
b
N n+1
)   F
b
q
(t
b
N n
)], where  is a normalization factor under Bayesian
updating, and the terms in the brackets are the probability that B's evidence lies in the
interval that allows A's choice to be pivotal. Thus, choosing n instead of n  1 is optimal
if and only if y
a
 t
a
n
where the threshold t
a
n
satises
(13) l
a
(t
a
n
)L
b
(t
b
N n+1
; t
b
N n
) = k
a
:
MLRP implies that L
j
(u; v) is increasing in both u and v for all u > v.
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Since the
above argument holds for n = 1; : : : ;N , the thresholds dened by equations (13) satisfy
t
a
1
< : : : < t
a
N
. Thus, if member B uses a voting strategy with thresholds t
b
1
< : : : < t
b
N
,
the threshold strategy dened by (13) is optimal for member A.
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The equilibrium thresholds are described by the N equations in (13), and a symmetric
set ofN equations for memberB. Conditions (4) for the two-category equilibrium outcome
and conditions (12) for the three-category equilibrium outcome are special cases of (13). If
members have identical preferences, categorization can get ner and ner as N increases.
The solution converges to that implied by the Neyman-Pearson lemma, and full information
revelation occurs. However, conicts in preferences place an upper bound on how ne
categorization can be in equilibrium. This is illustrated with the help of Figure 2, where
we assume without loss of generality that k
a
< k
b
. The area above S
a
= 0 (represented
by l
a
l
b
= k
a
) and below S
b
= 0 (represented by l
a
l
b
= k
b
) is the disagreement zone. Since
L
j
(u; v) is increasing in both u and v for all u > v, we have l
j
(u) > L
j
(u; v) > l
j
(v). Then,
for any two adjacent equilibrium thresholds t
a
n
and t
a
n+1
, from the equilibrium conditions
(13),
(14)
l
a
(t
a
n
)l
b
(t
b
N n
) < k
a
;
l
a
(t
a
n+1
)l
b
(t
b
N n
) > k
b
:
Thus, the threshold point (t
a
n
; t
b
N n
) is below S
a
= 0, and the point (t
a
n+1
; t
b
N n
) is above
S
b
= 0. That A's observation y
a
lies between t
a
n
and t
a
n+1
is pivotal for determining B's
threshold t
b
N n
. This means that the line segment connecting the two points (t
a
n
; t
b
N n
)
and (t
a
n+1
; t
b
N n
) is on the decreasing step function that separates the acceptance region
from the rejection region. Since the argument applies to any two adjacent thresholds of A,
any \horizontal" segment on the decreasing step function must \cross" the disagreement
zone. Moreover, the same conditions (14) imply that any \vertical" line segment of the
decreasing step function must also cross the disagreement zone: for example, in Figure
2 the point (t
a
n
; t
b
N n
) is below S
a
= 0 and the point (t
a
n
; t
b
N n+1
) is above S
b
= 0. We
summarize this result in the following proposition. We say that a partition outcome with
N thresholds t
j
1
; : : : ; t
j
N
for each member (j = a; b) \crosses the disagreement zone" in the
data space, if the thresholds satisfy (14) for any n (the conditions are reversed for the case
of k
a
> k
b
).
PROPOSITION 4: If k
a
6= k
b
, then any equilibrium partition outcome crosses the dis-
agreement zone in the data space.
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Greater conicts create a greater disagreement zone. The decreasing step function
associated with any equilibrium partition outcome must then cross a larger disagreement
zone, and the lower bound on the distance between adjacent thresholds for each member
becomes larger. The maximum possible number of thresholds for each member in any
equilibrium partition outcome is nite on any proper subset of the support of data, and
depends negatively on the dierence in preferences jk
a
  k
b
j.
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Great conicts within the
committee make ne categorization impossible.
Proposition 4 directly implies that any equilibrium partition outcome is ex post Pareto
inecient. In Figure 2, where we assume k
a
< k
b
, when the data (y
a
; y
b
) fall into any
triangular region above S
b
= 0 and below the step function, both A and B would like
to accept the null, but the equilibrium decision is rejection. Similarly, in any triangular
region below S
a
= 0 and above the step function, both A and B would like to reject
but the equilibrium decision is acceptance. Proposition 4 thus demonstrates that ex post
ineciency is a necessary consequence of sharing private information. As partitioning
becomes ner, the regions of ex post Pareto ineciency shrink. As a result, each member
becomes better o. The proof of Proposition 3 directly extends to establish that the
expected cost of each member decreases as the number of equilibrium thresholds increases
for each member.
Since the maximum number of categories is limited by the extent of conict, Proposi-
tion 4 raises the question of whether committee decision rules must be frequently adjusted
to accommodate changes in preferences of committee members. The answer is \no," be-
cause a scoring rule that allows ne partitioning of data can also produce equilibrium
outcomes with coarser partitioning. For example, suppose that the scoring rule allows a
maximum of 10 categories, in which each member can choose a score from 0 to 9, and the
threshold is 8.5. If the extent of conict is so great that only two-category partitioning
of private data is possible, then one equilibrium is where each member chooses the score
0 when his private data are below his personal threshold and the score 9 otherwise. This
equilibrium yields the unilateral acceptance outcome with two categories.
Voting procedures and scoring games considered in this paper are also robust in a
dierent sense. The same equilibrium partition outcomes arise if, instead of submitting
{ 23 {
votes or scores simultaneously, the two members in a committee express their positions
one by one, or they are allowed to change after all positions are known.
17
The reason is
that under pivotal voting, each member chooses a vote or score conditional on his data
and on the assumption that his fellow member has taken up a position to make his own
pivotal. Thus, no one wants to change after knowing the other side's position.
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VI. Conclusion
Committee members' incentives to manipulate private information to tilt decisions
toward their personally preferred outcome imply that information cannot be eciently
aggregated by committees. Perhaps this is the basis for the old joke: \Q. How do commit-
tees make decisions? A. Badly." Nonetheless, committees are used to make many business
and other decisions. We have illuminated some of the reasons for their continued use and
survival. True, self interest and strategic considerations make information pooling in com-
mittees imperfect, but that is relative to some unattainable ideal. Garbled information
still leads to better decisions for all members than if one of them acted as \dictator" and
made the decision without benet of other, albeit strategically manipulated, information.
The reason is that viable committees must share some common goals, even though
individual committee members might weigh outcomes somewhat dierently. All members
certainly want to gain the statistical advantages of information sharing. What makes the
process work is that the committee rules and procedures are themselves chosen to temper
and control strategic misrepresentations and lter the data, given self-interested behavior.
Procedures are adopted that coarsen the content of information and put a natural limit
on feasible manipulations. They control conict in an acceptable way. The smaller the
dierences of a priori opinion among committee members, the less coarsening the rules can
be while keeping conict in control. The quality of committee decisions improves with the
degree of consensus.
The two-category voting procedures studied in detail here are a very clear analytical
representation of these ideas. In the statistical decision problem from which it is con-
structed, all sample information is perfectly aggregated into a \score." Minimizing the
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loss function sets a critical score. If the sample score exceeds the threshold, the commit-
tee makes one decision, and if it falls short of the threshold another decision is chosen.
But this perfect aggregation scheme does not work when there is conict in the committee.
Voting in a committee is a cruder kind of scoring system, but a scoring system nonetheless.
The committee decision depends on the proportion of members whose sample information
places it above or below their own strategically determined personal thresholds. Personal
thresholds are chosen to \undo" the presumed biases of other committee members, but not
by enough to completely nullify the information of others. For instance, members defer to
those who have more informed sample information|committee members who have greater
expertise and whose data have a higher quality. The better informed members are decisive
more often.
The framework of this paper can be used to understand a host of issues related to
committee decision-making. We give three examples here, management of expert teams,
side payments, and arbitration. (i) In some environments, an uninformed decision maker
may seek opinion from experts who are privately informed about the decision but have
dierent interests. A team of experts is a committee with conicts and common interests
in inuencing the decision maker. One can show that when the decision maker nds it
necessary to bring in a second expert, he will not choose someone with the same preference
as himself, because doing so forces the incumbent expert to be more strategic and lowers
the quality of his information. Instead, a second expert with a preference closer to that
the rst serves the decision maker better.
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(ii) Monetary side payments can be used to
improve quality of committee decisions. For example, suppose that in a two-category
voting procedure each member must pay a ne to the other one if he chooses the position
he favors a priori. When such ex post transfers are properly chosen, the members can be
induced to vote cooperatively to minimize the sum of expected errors. With appropriate
ex ante side transfers, each member is better o than under strategic voting without side
transfers. (iii) Suppose that in a two-category voting procedure when votes dier the case
goes to an arbitrator whose decision is stochastic. Under the unilateral procedures, when
votes dier the decision is deterministic and may favor one side over the other. In contrast,
the presence of an exogenous stochastic decision by an arbitrator can reduce manipulation
of information and improve the quality of committee decision.
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While there are few general analytical results on how voting plurality| simple major-
ity, super-majority, or unanimity|aects the quality of committee decisions, the analysis
illuminates some of the economic considerations involved in these debates. It is interesting
that though requiring unanimity for acceptance makes each member decisive for accep-
tance, self-interest makes them less cautious in voting for acceptance because others may
have information against acceptance. Similarly, requiring unanimity for rejection makes
voters more cautious in voting for acceptance. These are precisely the reasons why Con-
dorcet's Theorem fails when strategic considerations play a role in voting (Austin-Smith
and Banks, 1996; Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1998). Our model needs to be enriched be-
fore it can be used to understand the issue of optimal plurality. Committee rules are chosen
to achieve a certain kind of durability to a broad variety of issues that come before it. The
nature of preferences, voting rules, incentives to collect information (Li, forthcoming), the
presentation of arguments and rhetoric in committee deliberations (Richard Posner, 1998;
Dewatripont and Tirole, 1999), and intertemporal vote trading for ongoing committees are
all likely to be important for understanding the choice of committee rules.
In conclusion, voting is often said to be an inferior decision mechanism because it
does not allow the intensity of one's preferences to be expressed in the nal tally. But
in group decisions where social gains arise from the pooling of information, the intensity
of dierences in preferences and opinion leads to discordance among group members that
causes trouble. Voting procedures bound the expression of intensity and discordance among
groupmembers and lead to better informed group decisions. Perhaps this is the main lesson
in this paper.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
Fix any deterministic and monotone equilibrium outcome. By the revelation principle,
it can be replicated by a truth-telling equilibrium of a direct mechanism. Since it is
deterministic and monotone, this outcome can be represented by a downward sloping
boundary that divides the acceptance region and the rejection region in the data space.
For a given equilibrium outcome, let the boundary be represented by a function T of y
a
.
(For each vertical segment of T that corresponds to some point y
a
, we choose T (y
a
) to
be the highest point of the segment; this arbitrary choice does not aect the proof.) We
claim that if T is dierentiable at some y
a
, then T
0
(y
a
) = 0. The proposition then follows
from the observation that a monotone function T is almost everywhere dierentiable.
To prove the claim, we assume by way of contradiction that there exists y
a
such that
T
0
(y
a
) 6= 0. Conditional on y
a
, to member A the probability that the null hypothesis
is true is 
a
f
a
q
(y
a
), and the probability that it is false is (1   
a
)f
a
u
(y
a
), where the
normalizing factor  equals the reciprocal of 
a
f
a
q
(y
a
) + (1   
a
)f
a
u
(y
a
). By choosing
an arbitrary report r
a
, the hypothesis is accepted whenever B submits a report r
b

T (r
a
). Since B reports truthfully, A's expected cost conditional on y
a
and report r
a
is
k
a
1
f
a
u
(y
a
)[1   F
b
u
(T (r
a
))] + k
a
2
f
a
q
(y
a
)F
b
q
(T (r
a
)). Truth-telling by A requires that the
derivatives of A's expected cost with respect to r
a
be zero at y
a
. Since T
0
(y
a
) 6= 0, we
have
(A1) k
a
1
f
a
u
(y
a
)f
b
u
(y
b
) = k
a
2
f
a
q
(y
a
)f
b
q
(y
b
);
where y
b
= T (y
a
). Since T is strictly downward sloping at y
a
, its inverse exists and has
nonzero derivatives at y
b
. Then truth-telling by B implies a similar condition:
(A2) k
b
1
f
b
u
(y
b
)f
a
u
(y
a
) = k
b
2
f
b
q
(y
b
)f
a
q
(y
a
):
The above two equations contradict the assumption that k
a
6= k
b
.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
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We consider a Cournot tatonnement process that begins with the two-category equi-
librium without abstention and converges towards the three-category equilibrium with
abstention. First note that any one-threshold strategy can be viewed as a two-threshold
strategy by adding an additional threshold for each member appropriately. If z
a
1
= y
a
and
z
a
2
= t
a

are member A's two thresholds, and z
b
1
= t
b

and z
b
2
= y
b
are B's two thresh-
olds, then the voting outcome is the same as the two-category equilibrium dened by (4).
In each iteration of the Cournot tatonnement, the new thresholds are chosen as best re-
sponses to the previous thresholds. The proof proceeds in two steps. First we show that
the two-category equilibrium converges monotonically to the three-category equilibrium in
a Cournot tatonnement process. Then we show that expected cost to each member falls
in each iteration of the tatonnement.
The equilibrium conditions for the thresholds of member A specied in (12) can be
used to dene the reaction functions z
a
1
= g
1
(z
b
1
; z
b
2
) and z
a
2
= g
2
(z
b
1
). The reaction
functions for member B can be specied analogously. Note that all the reaction functions
are strictly decreasing in their arguments. If we denote x = (z
a
1
; z
a
2
; z
b
1
  z
b
2
) and let
h : IR
4
! IR
4
be the reaction function in the redened variables, then h(x) is increasing
in x. The Cournot tatonnement is dened by the process x(t) = h(x(t   1)). The initial
thresholds are specied at the two-category equilibrium, x(0) = (y
a
; t
a

; t
b

; y
b
). An
induction argument establishes that x(t) increases monotonically. Suppose x(t)  x(t 1).
Because h() is monotonic, x(t + 1) = h(x(t))  h(x(t   1)) = x(t). Furthermore, using
the conditions for the two-category equilibrium and (6), it can be veried that x(1) =
h(x(0))  x(0), and the induction argument is complete. A bounded and monotonic
sequence converges to a limit point x^. By the continuity of each member's expected cost
in the thresholds, this point must also be an equilibrium point, x^ = h(x^). To see this, note
that C
a
(x
a
(t); x
b
(t 1))  C
a
(x
a
; x
b
(t 1)) for all x
a
, because x(t) is the best response to
x(t  1). Since C
a
is continuous in x(t) and x(t)! x^, we have C
a
(x^
a
; x^
b
)  C
a
(x
a
; x^
b
) for
all x
a
. A similar condition holds for B. Therefore x^ is a three-category equilibrium point.
Because the convergence of the thresholds is monotonic, we have t
a
2
> t
a

and t
b
1
< t
b

.
A symmetric Cournot tatonnement process, in which A's thresholds begin with z
a
1
= t
a

and z
a
2
= y
a
and monotonically decrease, and B's thresholds begin with z
b
1
= t
b
and
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zb
2
= y
b

for B and monotonically increase, establishes that t
a
1
< t
a

and t
b
2
> t
b

. Therefore,
t
j
1
< t
j

< t
j
2
for each j = a; b.
For the second step of the proof, we assume that k
a
< k
b
and use the Cournot
tatonnement process with A's thresholds increasing and B's decreasing. (When k
a
> k
b
,
we use the symmetric process.) Let the expected cost to juror j be
(A3)
C(z
a
; z
b
; k
j
) =k
j
f[1  F
a
u
(z
a
2
)] + [F
a
u
(z
a
2
)  F
a
u
(z
a
1
)][1  F
b
u
(z
b
1
)] + F
a
u
(z
a
1
)[1  F
b
u
(z
b
1
)]g
+ f[F
a
q
(z
a
2
)   F
a
q
(z
a
1
)]F
b
q
(z
b
1
) + F
a
q
(z
a
1
)F
b
q
(z
b
2
)g:
The change in cost to juror A between two successive iterations is
(A4)
C(z
a
(t + 1); z
b
(t + 1); k
a
)  C(z
a
(t); z
b
(t); k
a
)
=[C(z
a
(t + 1); z
b
(t + 1); k
a
)   C(z
a
(t); z
b
(t+ 1); k
a
)]
+ [C(z
a
(t); z
b
(t + 1); k
a
)  C(z
a
(t); z
b
(t); k
a
)]:
We claim that (i) @C(z
a
; z
b
(t + 1); k
a
)=@z
a
< 0 for z
a
(t)  z
a
 z
a
(t + 1); and (ii)
@C(z
a
(t); z
b
; k
a
)=@z
b
> 0 for z
b
(t + 1)  z
b
 z
b
(t). Hence both terms in brackets are
negative.
To establish claim (i), note that the derivative @C(z
a
; z
b
(t+1); k
a
)=@z
a
1
has the same
sign as l
a
(z
a
1
)L
b
(z
b
2
(t+1); z
b
1
(t+1)) k
a
. Since z
a
1
< z
a
1
(t+2) for z
a
1
2 [z
a
1
(t); z
a
1
(t+1)], we
have l
a
1
(z
a
1
) < l
a
1
(z
a
1
(t+2)). Then it follows from the denition of z
a
1
(t+2) that @C(z
a
; z
b
(t+
1); k
a
)=@z
a
1
< 0. Similarly, the derivative @C(z
a
; z
b
(t + 1); k
a
)=@z
a
2
has the same sign as
l
a
(z
a
2
)L
b

(z
b
1
(t+1))  k
a
. Since z
a
2
(t+2) > z
a
2
, we have @C(z
a
; z
b
(t+1); k
a
)=@z
a
2
< 0. This
establishes (i).
To establish claim (ii), note that the derivative @C(z
a
(t); z
b
; k
a
)=@z
b
1
has the same sign
as l
b
(z
b
1
)L
a
(z
a
2
(t); z
a
1
(t)) k
a
. Since k
a
< k
b
and z
b
1
 z
b
1
(t+1) for z
b
1
2 [z
b
1
(t+1); z
b
1
(t)], we
have @C(z
a
(t); z
b
; k
a
)=@z
b
1
> 0. Similarly, the derivatives @C(z
a
(t); z
b
; k
a
)=@z
b
2
have the
same sign as l
b
(z
b
2
)L
a

(z
a
1
(t))   k
a
. Since z
b
2
 z
b
2
(t + 1), @C(z
a
(t); z
b
; k
a
)=@z
b
2
> 0. This
establishes (ii).
For juror B, we follow a dierent decomposition to get
(A5)
C(z
a
(t + 1); z
b
(t + 1); k
b
)  C(z
a
(t); z
b
(t); k
b
)
=[C(z
a
(t + 1); z
b
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b
)   C(z
a
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b
(t); k
b
)]
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b
(t); k
b
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We can follow similar steps as above to show (i) @C(z
a
(t + 1); z
b
; k
b
)=@z
b
> 0 for
z
b
(t + 1)  z
b
 z
b
(t); and (ii) @C(z
a
; z
b
(t); k
b
)=@z
a
< 0 for z
a
(t + 1)  z
a
 z
a
(t). Then
(i) and (ii) imply juror B's expected cost also falls with each iteration.
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1. See also Jerry Green and Nancy Stokey (1980). Bengt Holmstrom (1983) studies
how a principal can delegate to an agent. The problem of eliciting private information
from experts appears in a number of economic and political models: allocating burden
of proof among experts (Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, 1986; Hyun Song Shin, 1994;
John Morgan and Vijay Krishna, forthcoming), agenda-setting in legislatures (Thomas
Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel, 1989; David Austen-Smith, 1990), and providing incentives
for investment in expertise (Canice Prendergast, 1993; Pilippe Aghion and Jean Tirole,
1997; Mathias Dewatripont and Tirole, 1999).
2. Exceptions are, in the context of large elections, Austen-Smith and Jerey Banks (1996),
and Timothy Feddersen and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (1996; 1997).
3. See, for example, Morris DeGroot (1970). This optimal decision rule derived below is a
special case of the Neyman-Pearson lemma.
4. Suppose f
j
q
and f
j
u
(j = a; b) dier only by a location parameter. That is, f
j
u
(x) = h(x)
and f
j
q
(x) = h(x   d) where d > 0. Then l
j
is increasing if h is log-concave. Of course,
MLRP is more general than log concavity, as there is no reason to assume that f
j
q
and f
j
u
dier only by a location parameter.
5. Figure 1 assumes that Y
a
and Y
b
have the same normal distributions that dier by
a locational parameter conditional on the true state. The mean of the observations is a
sucient statistic and the optimal statistical decision rule (2) takes a linear form, \accept if
and only if y
a
+y
b
 ," where  is a function of the preference and distribution parameters.
Under the assumption of conditional independence, regardless of whether Y
a
and Y
b
have
the same conditional distributions, the optimal rule can be generally expressed in a linear
aggregation of the log likelihood ratios. See, for example, Anthony Edwards (1992).
6. There are two types of garbling: introducing noise to data by randomization, and par-
titioning data into intervals. In any Bayesian reporting game with a deterministic and
strictly monotone decision rule, besides the partition equilibria studied in this paper, there
are also mixed-strategy equilibria where data are partitioned into intervals but for some
or all intervals a report is randomly chosen. In both types of equilibria, each member's
equilibrium report is a random variable with discontinuous distributions (conditional on
the true state). One can show that there exist no mixed-strategy equilibria where each
member's report has continuous conditional distributions. Since the underlying data have
continuous conditional distributions, equilibrium reporting strategies must involve parti-
tioning of data.
7. Stochastic outcomes cannot be excluded as candidates for equilibrium outcomes. The
reporting game with the rule \accept if S(r
a
; r
b
)  0" has mixed strategy equilibria where
data are partitioned and in some regions the null is accepted with probabilities strictly
between 0 and 1. One such equilibrium can be alternatively implemented by the following
decision mechanism. Each member chooses \accept" or \reject." If they agree, that choice
is carried out. If they disagree, a lottery with predetermined odds is used to decide. One
can show that this mechanism has a stochastic outcome with threshold strategies. Exam-
ples can also be constructed to show that MLRP does not by itself rule out nonmonotone
outcomes, but we do not consider them.
8. If only one member is allowed to abstain, then one can generate partition outcomes
with three categories for this member and two categories for the other. This corresponds
to a voting game where the member allowed to abstain has veto rights to both acceptance
and rejection. Note that Proposition 1 implies that in any equilibrium partition outcome,
either both members have the same number of thresholds, or one member has exactly
one more threshold than the other. Only the simplest partition outcome with unequal
numbers of thresholds is considered in the paper (section III), in which one member has
one threshold and the other has none. This corresponds to delegation of the committee
decision to the rst member.
9. The pivotal voting argument remains valid when there is incomplete information about
preferences and biases of committee members. Such incomplete information can be mod-
eled as dierent types of members. Derivation of the equilibria of the voting games is not
aected as long as probability distributions of types are common knowledge.
10. John Duggan and Cesar Martinelli (1999) uses a setup similar to ours to extend the
results of Feddersen and Pesendorfer on the Condorcet Jury Theorem. They characterize
the two-category equilibrium outcomes, assuming common preferences among members.
11. For example, in Figure 1 where Y
j
is normally distributed with a shift of the mean
conditional on the true state of the null hypothesis, when the precision of Y
a
increases,
the committee decision function S becomes steeper in the data space, representing the fact
that the decision becomes more sensitive to A's data.
12. The precise argument that B prefers committee decision-making to delegating to A
when k
b
> k
a
follows the proof of Proposition 5.1. For B, letting A decide is equivalent
to the committee decision with thresholds set at
^
t
a
and y
b
. Start the iteration at z
a
0
=
^
t
a
,
and z
b
0
= y
b
. Dene a Cournot tatonnement process with increasing threshold for A and
decreasing threshold for B. Then B's expected cost falls in each step of the iteration, until
the thresholds reach t
a

and t
b

.
13. Our comparison of voting procedures complements the works of Raaj Sah and Joseph
Stiglitz (1986; 1988), who consider committees without the strategic manipulations that
arise from conicting interests.
14. If we think of abstention as skipping the decision-making meeting in an endogenous
participation model, then only members with extreme preferences based on their informa-
tion participate. Matthew Turner, Martin Osborne, and Jerey Rothenthal (2000) obtain
a related result in a model of preference aggregation where agents incur a xed cost to
inuence the collective decision.
15. The derivative of this ratio with respect to u has the same sign as f
j
q
(u)[F
j
u
(u) F
j
u
(v)] 
f
j
u
(u)[F
j
q
(u)  F
j
q
(v)]. By MLRP, f
j
q
(u)f
j
u
(y) > f
j
u
(u)f
j
q
(y) for all y < u. Integrating over
y from v to u gives f
j
q
(u)[F
j
u
(u)   F
j
u
(v)] > f
j
u
(u)[F
j
q
(u)   F
j
q
(v)]. Monotonicity in v can
be proved in a similar manner.
16. Members can have countably innite number of equilibrium thresholds over the entire
support of the data, either when the supports are unbounded (as in normal distributions),
or when the supports are nite but the likelihood ratios are unbounded (as in the beta
distributions).
17. In a dierent setup, Dekel and Piccione (2000) show that sequential and simultaneous
voting procedures have the same equilibrium outcomes. In our model the equivalence
between sequential and simultaneous voting requires that the rst mover be unable to
commit to a threshold rule. Inability to commit follows because a strategy in a voting or
scoring game is not observable even when positions are sequentially submitted.
18. Green and Jean-Jacques Laont (1987) propose the concept of \posterior implemen-
tation" to capture the idea of robustness of group decisions under private information: a
decision is posterior implementable if it is an equilibrium outcome of a Bayesian incen-
tive compatible mechanism, with the additional property that the information conveyed in
the implementation does not invalidate the optimality of the equilibrium strategy of any
player. In a model similar to ours, with two group members and a binary group decision
between the status quo and an alternative, they show that any posterior implementable
group decision can have only two values in terms of the probability of adopting the alter-
native. In any partition outcome, the committee decision has two values|the probability
of accepting the null hypothesis is either zero or one. One can easily verify that all equilib-
rium partition outcomes considered in this paper are posterior implementable in the sense
of Green and Laont.
19. These and other issues of choosing experts and delegating decisions are discussed in
Hao Li and Wing Suen (2001).
Figure 1. Optimal decision rules and information manipulation.
Figure 2. A partition outcome.
Figure 3. Reaction functions in the voting game with unilateral acceptance.
Figure 4. Welfare comparison: do-it-alone versus committee.
Figure 5. Comparison of unilateral acceptance and unilateral rejection procedures.
Figure 6. Conicts and personal preference over voting procedures.
